Essay
The Proper Sphere of Government (1843)
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This series of twelve letters was
published in The Nonconformist in 1842-43. In 1843 the
letters were reprinted under the present title by W. Brittain of
London and sold for fourpence.
Letter I
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6.0 |
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Things of the first importance—principles influencing all the
transactions of a country—principles involving the weal or woe
of nations, are very generally taken for granted by society. When
a certain line of conduct, however questionable may be its
policy—however momentous may be its good or evil results, has
been followed by our ancestors, it usually happens that the great
masses of mankind continue the same course of action, without ever
putting to themselves the question—Is it right? Custom has the
enviable power, of coming to conclusions upon most debatable
points, without a moment's consideration—of turning propositions
of a very doubtful character into axioms—and of setting aside
almost self-evident truths as unworthy of consideration.
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6.1 |
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Of all subjects thus cavalierly treated, the fundamental
principles of legislation, are perhaps the most important.
Politicians—all members of the community who have the welfare of
their fellow-men at heart, have their hopes, opinions, and wishes,
centered in the actions of government. It therefore behoves them
fully to understand the nature, the intention, the proper sphere
of action of a government. Before forming opinions upon the best
measures to be adoped by a legislative body, it is necessary that
well defined views of the power of that body should be formed;
that it be understood how far it can go consistently with its
constitution; that it be decided what it may do and what it may
not do. And yet, how few men have ever given the matter any
serious consideration; how few, even of those who are interested
in the affairs of society, ever put to themselves the
question—Is there any boundary to the interference of
government? and, if so, what is that boundary?
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6.2 |
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We hear one man proclaiming the advantages that would accrue,
if all the turnpike roads in the kingdom were kept in repair by
the state; another would saddle the nation with a medical
establishment, and preserve the popular health by legislation; and
a third party maintains that government should make railways for
Ireland, at the public expense. The possibility of there being any
impropriety in meddling with these things never suggests itself.
Government always has exercised the liberty of universal
interference, and nobody ever questioned its right to do so. Our
ancestors, good people, thought it quite reasonable that the
executive should have unlimited power (or probably they never
troubled themselves to think about it at all); and as they made no
objection, we, in our wise veneration for the "good old
times," suppose that all is as it should be. Some few,
however, imbued with the more healthy spirit of investigation, are
not content with this simple mode of settling such questions, and
would rather ground their convictions upon reason, than upon
custom. To such are addressed the following considerations.
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6.3 |
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Everything in nature has its laws. Inorganic matter has its
dynamical properties, its chemical affinities; organic matter,
more complex, more easily destroyed, has also its governing
principles. As with matter in its integral form, so with matter in
its aggregate; animate beings have their laws, as well as the
material, from which they are derived. Man, as an animate being,
has functions to perform, and has organs for performing those
functions; he has instincts to be obeyed, and the means of obeying
those instincts; and, so long as he performs those functions, as
he obeys those instincts, as he bends to the laws of his nature,
so long does he remain in health. All disobedience to these
dictates, all transgression, produces its own punishment. Nature
will be obeyed.
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6.4 |
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As with man physically, so with man spiritually. Mind has its
laws as well as matter. The mental faculties have their individual
spheres of action in the great business of life; and upon their
proper development, and the due performance of their duties,
depend the moral integrity, and the intellectual health, of the
individual. Psychical laws must be obeyed as well as physical
ones; and disobedience as surely brings its punishment in the one
case, as in the other.
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6.5 |
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As with man individually, so with man socially. Society as
certainly has its governing principles as man has. They may not be
so easily traced, so readily defined. Their action may be more
complicated, and it may be more difficult to obey them; but,
nevertheless, analogy shows us that they must exist. We see
nothing created but what is subject to invariable regulations
given by the Almighty, and why should society be an exception? We
see, moreover, that beings having volition, are healthy and happy,
so long only as they act in accordance with those regulations; and
why should not the same thing be true of man in his collective
capacity?
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6.6 |
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This point conceded, it follows that the well being of a
community, depends upon a thorough knowledge of social principles,
and an entire obedience to them. It becomes of vital importance to
know, what institutions are necessary to the prosperity of
nations; to discover what are the duties of those institutions; to
trace the boundaries of their action; to take care that they
perform their functions properly; and especially to see, that they
aim not at duties for which they were not intended, and for which
they are not fitted.
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6.7 |
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The legislature is the most important of all national
institutions, and as such, it claims our first attention in the
investigation of social laws. An attempt to arrive at its
principles, from the analysis of existing governments, with all
their complex and unnatural arrangements, would be a work of
endless perplexity, and one from which it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to educe any satisfactory result. To
obtain clear ideas, we must consider the question abstractly; we
must suppose society in its primitive condition; we must view
circumstances and requirements as they would naturally arise; and
we shall then be in a position to judge properly, of the relation
which should exist, between a people and a government.
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6.8 |
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Let us, then, imagine a number of men living together without
any recognised laws—without any checks upon their actions, save
those imposed by their own fears of consequences—obeying nothing
but the impulses of their own passions—what is the result? The
weak—those who have the least strength, or the least
influence—are oppressed by the more powerful: these, in their
turn, experience the tyranny of men still higher in the scale; and
even the most influential, are subject to the combined vengeance
of those whom they have injured. Every man, therefore, soon comes
to the conclusion, that his individual interest as well as that of
the community at large, will best be served by entering into some
common bond of protection: all agree to become amenable to the
decisions of their fellows, and to obey certain general
arrangements. Gradually the population increases, their disputes
become more numerous, and they find that it will be more
convenient to depute this arbitrative power, to one or more
individuals, who shall be maintained by the rest, in consideration
of their time being devoted to the business of the public. Here we
have a government springing naturally out of the requirements of
the community. But what are those requirements? Is the government
instituted for the purpose of regulating trade—of dictating to
each man where he shall buy and where he shall sell? Do the people
wish to be told what religion they must believe, what forms and
ceremonies they must practice, or how many times they must attend
church on a Sunday?*79
Is education the object contemplated? Do they ask instruction in
the administration of their charity—to be told to whom they
shall give, and how much, and in what manner they shall give it?
Do they require their means of communication—their roads and
railways—designed and constructed for them? Do they create a
supreme power to direct their conduct in domestic affairs—to
tell them at what part of the year they shall kill their oxen, and
how many servings of meat they shall have at a meal?*80
In short, do they want a government because they see that the
Almighty has been so negligent in designing social mechanisms,
that everything will go wrong unless they are continually
interfering? No; they know, or they ought to know, that the laws
of society are of such a character, that natural evils will
rectify themselves; that there is in society, as in every other
part of creation, that beautiful self-adjusting principle, which
will keep all its elements in equilibrium; and, moreover, that as
the interference of man in external nature often destroys the just
balance, and produces greater evils than those to be remedied, so
the attempt to regulate all the actions of a community by
legislation, will entail little else but misery and confusion.
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6.9 |
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What, then, do they want a government for? Not to regulate
commerce; not to educate the people; not to teach religion; not to
administer charity; not to make roads and railways; but simply to
defend the natural rights of man—to protect person and
property—to prevent the aggressions of the powerful upon the
weak—in a word, to administer justice. This is the natural, the
original, office of a government. It was not intended to do less:
it ought not to be allowed to do more.
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6.10 |
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Philosophical politicians usually define government, as a body
whose province it is, to provide for the "general good."
But this practically amounts to no definition at all, if by a
definition is meant a description, in which the limits of the
thing described are pointed out. It is necessary to the very
nature of a definition, that the words in which it is expressed
should have some determinate meaning; but the expression
"general good," is of such uncertain character, a thing
so entirely a matter of opinion, that there is not an action that
a government could perform, which might not be contended to be a
fulfilment of its duties. Have not all our laws, whether really
enacted for the public benefit or for party aggrandisement, been
passed under the plea of promoting the "general good?"
And is it probable that any government, however selfish, however
tyrannical, would be so barefaced as to pass laws avowedly for any
other purpose? If, then, the very term "definition,"
implies a something intended to mark out the boundaries of the
thing defined, that cannot be a definition of the duty of a
government, which will allow it to do anything and everything.
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6.11 |
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It was contended in the preceding letter, that "the
administration of justice" was the sole duty of the state.
Probably it will be immediately objected, that this definition is
no more stringent than the other—that the word
"justice" is nearly as uncertain in its signification as
the expression "general good"—that one man thinks it
but "justice" towards the landowner, that he should be
protected from the competition of the foreign corn grower; another
maintains that "justice" demands that the labourer's
wages should be fixed by legislation, and that since such varied
interpretations may be given to the term, the definition falls to
the ground. The reply is very simple. The word is not used in its
legitimate sense. "Justice" comprehends only the
preservation of man's natural rights. Injustice implies a
violation of those rights. No man ever thinks of demanding
"justice" unless he is prepared to prove that violation;
and no body of men can pretend that "justice" requires
the enactment of any law, unless they can show that their natural
rights would otherwise be infringed. If it be conceded that this
is the proper meaning of the word, the objection is invalid,
seeing that in the cases above cited, and in all similar ones, it
is not applicable in this sense.
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6.12 |
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Having thus examined the exact meaning of the new definition,
and having observed its harmony with the original wants of
society, we may at once proceed to consider its practical
applications; and, in the first few cases, it may be well, for the
sake of showing the different effects of the two principles, to
note, at the same time, the results of the doctrine of
"general good." First, the great question of the
day—the corn laws. Our legislators tell us that we have an
enormous national debt; that we have to pay the interest of it;
and that a free trade would so change the value of money, that we
should not be able to raise the taxes; moreover, that were we to
allow a competition, between foreign and home-grown produce, the
land must be thrown out of cultivation—our agricultural
population would be deprived of employment—and that great
distress must be the result. These and sundry other plausible
reasons, they bring forward, to show that restrictions upon the
importation of corn, are necessary to the "general
good." On the other hand, suppose we had free trade. Could
our farmer complain that it was an infringement of his natural
rights, to allow the consumers to purchase their food from any
other parties whose prices were lower? Could he urge that the
state was not acting justly towards him, unless it forced the
manufacturer to give him a high price for that, which he could get
on more advantageous terms elsewhere? No. "Justice"
would demand no such interference. It is clear, therefore, that if
the "administration of justice" had been recognised as
the only duty of government, we should never have had any corn
laws; and, as the test may be applied to all other cases of
restrictions upon commerce with a similar result, it is equally
evident, that upon the same assumption, we should always have had
free trade.
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6.13 |
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Again, our clergy and aristocracy maintain, that it is
eminently necessary for the "general good" that we
should have an established church. They would have us believe that
the Christian religion is of itself powerless—that it will never
spread unless nurtured by the pure and virtuous hand
of the state—that the truth is too weak to make its way without
the assistance of acts of parliament—and that mankind are still
so universally selfish and worldly, that there is no chance of the
gospel being taught, unless comfortable salaries are provided for
its teachers—practically admitting, that were it not for the
emoluments their own ministry would cease, and thus inadvertently
confessing, that their interest, in the spiritual welfare of their
fellow-creatures, is co-extensive with their pecuniary
expectations. But, what says the other definition? Can it be
contended, that it is unjust to the community to allow each
individual to put what construction he sees best upon the
scriptures? Can the man who disputes the authority of learned
divines, and dares to think for himself, be charged with
oppression? Can it even be maintained, that he who goes so far as
to disbelieve the Christian religion altogether, is infringing the
privileges of his fellow-man? No. Then it follows, that an
established church is not only unnecessary to the preservation of
the natural rights of man, but that inasmuch as it denies the
subject the "rights of conscience," and compels him to
contribute towards the spread of doctrines of which he does not
approve, it is absolutely inimical to them. So that a state, in
setting up a national religion, stands in the anomalous position
of a transgressor of those very rights, that it was instituted to
defend. It is evident, therefore, that the restrictive principle,
would never have permitted the establishment of a state church.
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6.14 |
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And now, let us apply the test to that much-disputed
question—the poor law. Can any individual, whose wickedness or
improvidence has brought him to want, claim relief of his
fellow-men as an act of justice? Can even the industrious labourer,
whose distresses have not resulted from his own misconduct,
complain that his natural rights are infringed, unless the
legislature compels his neighbours to subscribe for his relief?
Certainly not. Injustice implies a positive act of oppression, and
no man or men can be charged with it, when merely maintaining a
negative position. To get a clearer view of this, let us again
refer to a primitive condition of society, where all start with
equal advantages. One part of the community is industrious and
prudent, and accumulates property; the other, idle and
improvident, or in some cases, perhaps, unfortunate. Can any of
the one class fairly demand relief from the other? Can even those,
whose poverty is solely the result of misfortune, claim part of
the produce of the industry of the others as a right? No. They may
seek their commiseration; they may hope for their assistance; but
they cannot take their stand upon the ground of justice. What is
true of these parties, is true of their descendants; the children
of the one class stand in the same relation to those of the other
that existed between their parents, and there is no more claim in
the fiftieth or sixtieth generation than in the first.
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6.15 |
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Possibly it may be objected to the assumption that the
different classes started upon equal terms, that it is not only
entirely gratuitous, but that it is contrary to fact; as we all
know, that the property was seized by the few, while the many were
left in poverty without any fault of their own and, that in this
circumstance, originates the right in question. I reply, that when
it can be shown that the two classes of the present day, are the
direct descendants of those alluded to; when it can be shown that
our poor are the children of the oppressed, and that those who
have to pay poor rates are the children of the oppressors, then,
the validity of the objection will be admitted; but that until
this is shown to be the truth, or an approach to the truth, the
objection may be disregarded. It appears, then, that the proposed
definition of the duty of the state, would never have allowed the
existence of a poor law.
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6.16 |
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From preceding arguments it was inferred, that if the
administration of justice had been recognised as the only duty of
the state, a national church would not have existed, that
restrictions upon commerce could never have been enacted, and that
a poor law would be inadmissible. As the last conclusion will not
meet with such general approbation as its predecessors, it is
deemed requisite to enter more fully into the evidence that may be
adduced in support of it: and the Nonconformist being the
organ of a political body, who profess to act upon principle and
not upon expediency, and who avow their intention to follow up
sound doctrine, whether it may lead to odium or popularity, it is
hoped that the arguments brought forward, will meet with a candid
consideration, apart from all personal or political bias.
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6.17 |
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The fund provided by the poor law is usually considered as a
contribution from the richer orders of the community, for the
support of the destitute; and, coming from the pockets of those in
easy circumstances, it is supposed to be a great boon to their
poorer neighbours. But this is not a correct mode of viewing the
case. A political economist would reason thus. Here is an
institution which practically divides the community into two great
classes—labourers and paupers, the one doing nothing towards the
production of the general stock of food and clothing, and the
other having to provide for the consumption of both. Hence it is
evident, that each member of the producing class, is injured by
the appropriation of a portion of the general stock by the
non-producing class. But who form the great bulk of the producing
class? The working population. Their labour is the chief
ingredient in the wealth of the nation; without them land and
capital would be useless. It follows, then, that this provision,
set apart for the poor, is mainly provided by the labours of the
people, and hence that the burden falls chiefly upon them.
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6.18 |
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Lest this generalizing style of argument should be
unsatisfactory, it may be well to adopt another mode of proof. We
know that the average cost of any article is determined by the
expenses attendant upon its production; that the price at which
the manufacturer sells his calico, is dependent upon the amount of
labour expended upon it, the cost of his machinery, the value of
the raw material, and so forth; and that the price at which the
farmer can afford to sell his corn, is governed by the amount of
his rent, the cost of cultivation, &c.; and we also know, that
if any one of these expenses is increased, a rise in the price of
the produce must follow; that if the landlords double their rents,
the farmers must charge more for their grain. Now the poor rates,
in some of the unions under the present law, are 40 per cent upon
the rental, and under the old law they were in some cases 75 and
100 per cent. What does this amount to but a doubling of the rent?
It matters not whether both portions are paid to the landlord, or
whether one half goes to him, and the other to the parish, the
effect upon the cost of the produce is the same, and the consumers
of that produce, have to pay a higher price for it, than they
would have to do, were no such demand made. But who form
the great mass of consumers?—The working population. They
then are the parties from whom the greater part of this additional
tax comes. Thus we arrive at the same conclusion as before; that
not only do the industrious classes contribute a considerable
portion of the poor rates directly, but that the greater part of
what apparently comes from the upper ranks, is originally derived
from them.
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6.19 |
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Many poor law advocates build their arguments upon the
existence of a corn law. They say that were there no bar to the
importation of foreign produce, and no consequent check to the
demand for our manufactures, they would not object to the working
man being dependent upon his own resources; but that so long as
the price of food is unnaturally raised, and the call for labour
so uncertain, they must maintain the necessity of a public
charity. To this there are two replies.
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6.20 |
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First, That the argument rests upon a wrong hypothesis,
originating as it does in the assumption, that public charity
proceeds from the stores of the rich, when, as has been shown, the
greater portion of it comes from the toils of the labouring
classes. The very parties for whose benefit the fund is raised,
are, in virtue of their productive industry, chiefly instrumental
in raising it. The fact, therefore, that the industrious
population are already suffering from a corn law, affords no
reason why one part of them should be still further burdened, by
having to provide food and clothing for the other.
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6.21 |
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Secondly, That the new definition of the duty of a government
is not in the least affected by the argument, seeking that free
trade is a necessary consequence of the same principle that
excludes a poor law; and if so, it follows that those objections
which are founded upon the existence of commercial restrictions,
are not applicable.
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6.22 |
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But even admitting that a poor law ameliorates the condition of
the labouring classes in times of national distress; still it does
not follow that it is either a wise, or, ultimately, a benevolent
law. So long as the earth continues to produce, and mankind are
willing to labour, an extensive distress must indicate something
unnatural in the social arrangements. Such is the present
condition of England. Europe and America produce more food than
they can consume—our artisans are anxious to work, and yet they
are bordering upon starvation, consequently there must be
something radically wrong, in our political institutions. Is it
better to palliate, or to cure the evil? Is it better to mitigate
the distress by the distribution of public charity, or to allow it
so to manifest itself, as to demand the discovery and removal of
its cause? Which do we consider the kindest physician, the one who
alleviates the pain of a disease by continually administering
anodynes, or the one who allows his patient to experience a little
suffering in the exhibition of the symptoms, that he may discover
the seat of the malady, and then provide a speedy remedy? The
alternative requires no consideration.
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6.23 |
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It is surprising that writers who have of late been
animadverting upon the national collection scheme, and who have
pointed out the mockery of recommending charity, in answer to a
call for justice, should not perceive that the case is but a type
of the poor law. Both are attempts to mitigate an evil, not to
remove it; both are means of quieting the complaints of the
nation, and both will tend to retard the attainment of those
rights which the people demand. The Times, in an article
upon the national petition, made an observation to the effect,
that the contents of the document were not worthy of notice, but
that the fact of its presentation, clearly proved the necessity
for a "more generous poor law," to satisfy the
complainants. Here is a clear exposition of the policy: we must
stop the mouths of the people by charity: we need not enter into
the question of their rights, but we must give them more parish
pay!
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6.24 |
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A poor law, however, is not only inexpedient in practice, but
it is defective in principle. The chief arguments that are urged
against an established religion, may be used with equal force
against an established charity. The dissenter submits, that no
party has a right to compel him to contribute to the support of
doctrines, which do not meet his approbation. The rate-payer may
as reasonably argue, that no one is justified in forcing him to
subscribe towards the maintenance of persons, whom he does not
consider deserving of relief. The advocate of religious freedom,
does not acknowledge the right of any council, or bishop, to
choose for him what he shall believe, or what he shall reject. So
the opponent of a poor law, does not acknowledge the right of any
government, or commissioner, to choose for him who are worthy of
his charity, and who are not. The dissenter from an established
church, maintains that religion will always be more general, and
more sincere, when the support of its ministry is not compulsory.
The dissenter from a poor law, maintains that charity will always
be more extensive, and more beneficial, when it is voluntary. The
dissenter from an established church can demonstrate that the
intended benefit of a state religion, will always be frustrated by
the corruption which the system invariably produces. So the
dissenter from a poor law, can show that the proposed advantages
of state charity, will always be neutralized by the evils of
pauperism, which necessarily follow in its train. The dissenter
from an established church, objects that no man has a right to
step in between him and his religion. So the dissenter from
established charity, objects that no man has a right to step in
between him and the exercise of his religion.
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6.25 |
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How is it, that those who are so determined in their endeavours
to rid themselves of the domination of a national church—who
declare that they do not need the instruction of the state in the
proper explanation of the gospel—how is it that these same men,
are tamely allowing and even advocating, the interference of the
state, in the exercise of one of the most important precepts of
that gospel? They deny the right of the legislature to explain the
theory, and yet argue the necessity of its direction in the
practice. Truly it indicates but little consistency on the part of
dissenters, that whilst they defend their independence in the
article of faith, they have so little confidence in their
own principles, that they look for extraneous aid in the
department of works. The man who sees the inhabitants of a
country deficient in spiritual instruction, and hence maintains
the necessity of a national religion, is doing no more than the
one who finds part of the population wanting in food and clothing,
and thence infers the necessity of a national charity.
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6.26 |
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Again, the moral effect of a poor law upon the rate-paying
portion of the community is little considered, although one of its
most important features. Here, also, there is an evident analogy
between established religion and established charity. It is said,
that in a system like that of our national church, in which the
visible duties of a communicant, consist chiefly, in attendance
upon public worship, reception of the sacraments, payment of
tithes, church rates, etc., the form will always be substituted
for the reality; that the periodical ceremonies will take the
place of the daily practice; that the physical will take the place
of the spiritual. It may be said, with equal truth, that a similar
effect will follow the establishment of a poor law; the same
principles in human nature are acted upon; the payment of poor
rates will supplant the exercise of real benevolence, and a
fulfilment of the legal form, will supersede the exercise of the
moral duty. Forced contributions rarely appeal to the kindly
feelings. The man who is called upon for a rate, does not put his
hand into his pocket out of pure sympathy for the poor; he looks
upon the demand as another tax, and feels annoyance rather than
pleasure, in paying it. Nor does the effect end here. The poor
labourer or artisan, who is struggling hard with the world to
maintain his independence, excites no pity. So long as there is a
poor law he cannot starve, and it will be time enough to consider
his case when he applies for relief. The beggar who knocks at his
door, or the way-worn traveler who accosts him in his walk, is
told to go to his parish; there is no need to inquire into his
history, and to give him private assistance if found deserving,
for there is already a public provision for him. Such is the state
of mind encouraged by national charity. When the legal demand is
paid, the conscience is satisfied; the party is absolved from all
exercise of generosity; charity is administered by proxy; the
nobler feelings are never required to gain the victory over the
selfish propensities; a dormant condition of those feelings
necessarily follows, and a depreciation of the national character
is the final result. The payment of poor rates bears the same
relation to real charity, that the attention to forms and
ceremonies bears to real religion.
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6.27 |
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But, it may be asked, how are we to know that voluntary
benevolence would suffice for the relief of the ordinary
distresses of the poor, were there no national provision? A
somewhat analogous question is put as an objection to the
extension of the suffrage—how are we to know that those who are
not fitted for the exercise of the franchise, will become so when
it is given to them? and a similar reply to that so ably employed
by the editor of the Nonconformist in that case, will apply
here. Men are not in the habit of preparing for duties they are
never called upon to perform; they are not in the habit of
exhibiting virtues which are never needed; moral vigour cannot
co-exist with moral inactivity; and the higher feelings will ever
remain inactive, until circumstances prompt them to exercise.
Hence, while there is a public provision for poverty, there will
be no incentive to the exercise of benevolence on the part of the
rich, and no stimulus to prudence and economy on the part of the
poor. So long as the one class can point to the pay table, they
will not give; and so long as the other have an inexhaustible fund
to apply to, they will not save. It may reasonably be concluded,
therefore, that were there no poor law, the rich would be more
charitable, and the poor more provident. The one would give more,
and the other would ask less.
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6.28 |
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A general view of the arguments shows:
1. That the burden of the poor law fall
chiefly upon the industrious classes.
2. That the existence of commercial restrictions, is,
therefore, no argument for retaining it.
3. That even assuming a poor law to be directly
beneficial, it is indirectly injurious, inasmuch as it prolongs
the causes of distress.
4. That established charity is open to many of the
strongest objections that can be urged against established
religion.
5. That a poor law discourages the exercise of real
benevolence, and lowers the standard of national character.
6. That were there no poor law, the increase of voluntary
charity, and the decrease of improvidence, would render one
unnecessary.
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6.29 |
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From these reasons it is concluded, that the proposed
definition of the duty of a government, in excluding a poor law,
is only excluding what is intrinsically bad.
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6.30 |
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My last letter, entering as it did rather deeply into the poor
law question, might almost be considered by some of your readers,
as a digression from the ostensible object of this essay, although
a very necessary one to the establishment of the principle
advocated. I must now, however, still further trespass upon their
patience, in the endeavour to answer the query proposed to
me—"Has not every man a right to a maintenance out of the
soil?" for this, after all, is the pith of the question
submitted.*81
Before proceeding, it may be observed, that the burden of proof
falls rather on the party who assert the right, than on those who
deny it. The originator of a proposition is usually required to
demonstrate its truth; not his opponent to show its fallacy.
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6.31 |
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Man has a claim to a subsistence derived from the soil.
It is his natural birth-right—the charter given to him at his
creation; and whoever, by iniquitous laws, oppressive taxation, or
any other means, puts difficulties in the way of his obtaining
that subsistence, is infringing that right. But, the right is
conditional—the produce is only promised to him in return for
the labour he bestows upon the soil; and if the condition is not
fulfilled, the right has no existence. Now the poor law principle
recognises this right, as independent of that condition; it
acknowledges the claim to a share in the produce, but demands no
equivalent labour. "Yes," it will be replied, "and
for a very good reason; because there is no direction in which
that labour can be profitably employed." Be it so; it cannot
be denied that this is to a certain extent true. But what then? Is
this a natural state of things? Is this great evil irremediable?
Is this want of a field for labour the inevitable result of the
constitution of the world? No, no! It is one of the evil
consequences of human selfishness—it is one of the many curses
flowing from class legislation. We know that were we righteously
governed, we should hear no cry for employment. Every man would
find something for his hand to do, and the promised sustenance
would flow abundantly from his labour. What, then, is our duty?
Ought we, because some of our fellow men, have, in the wantonness
of their power, made arrangements whereby a great part of the
people are prevented from earning their bread by the sweat of
their brow—ought we, I ask, calmly to submit, and give the
subsistence without the labour? Ought we not rather to destroy the
laws that have induced this disordered state; and by restoring the
healthy action of society, allow that natural fulfilment of the
promise, which a submission to its accompanying commandment would
ensure? The Almighty has given to man a privilege to be enjoyed
after obeying a certain condition: a human power steps in, and to
a certain extent renders obedience to that condition impossible:
shall we grant the privilege without any attention to the
condition? or shall we take away the obstacles which prevent our
fellow men from satisfying it? The answer is self-evident. We
come, then, to the conclusion that the unconditional right
to a maintenance out of the soil, is inconsistent with one of the
fundamental principles of our religion.
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6.32 |
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It may be objected that though employment be ever so abundant,
and society in its most prosperous state, there will still be
numerous cases of distress and destitution. Granted; but what
then? It must not be inferred that there needs any public
provision for them. In nine cases out of ten, such miseries result
from the transgressions of the individual or his parents: and are
we to take away the just punishment of those transgressions? We
are told that the sins of the wicked shall be visited upon the
children to the third and fourth generation. That visitation may
either exhibit itself in mental derangement, bodily disease, or
temporal want. The parent may either transmit to the child bad
moral tendencies, a constitutional taint, or may leave it in
circumstances of great misery. The visitation may comprehend any
or all of these. But the poor law steps in and says, "As far
as I can, I will annul this law. However great may have been your
misconduct, or that of your parents—notwithstanding your
destitution may have resulted solely from that misconduct, now
that you are in distress you have a just claim upon the property
of your fellow-creatures, and I will relieve you."*82
In doing this it not only takes away the punishment, but it also
destroys the most powerful incentive to reformation. Adversity is,
in many cases, the only efficient school for the transgressor.
Perhaps it may be asked, where is the justice, or the advantage,
of allowing the child to endure the temporal want resulting from
the sins of its parents? There is an advantage, and a great one:
The same tendency to immorality which characterised the parent is
bequeathed to the offspring—the moral disease requires a
cure—under a healthy social condition that cure will be
found in the poverty which has followed in its train. The malady
provides its own remedy—the poor-law right prevents that remedy
from being administered.
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6.33 |
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Let not this be misunderstood: it has no reference to the
present distresses of the people; it only applies to the few cases
of individual destitution, which would occur in a well-governed
country.
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6.34 |
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A natural right may, usually, be easily defined. Its boundaries
are self-existent. But it is not so with the poor law principle.
It says that every man has a right to a maintenance out of the
soil. But what is a maintenance? One party says that a bare
subsistence is all that is implied. Another, that the applicant
can demand all the comforts usually enjoyed by those in his
station. Another, that he may as fairly claim the luxuries of life
as those above him. And the extreme party will be content with
nothing short of the socialist principle, of community of
property. Who is to say which of these is the true expression of
the right? The gradations are infinite, and how can it be decided
where the claim begins and where it ends? Who can tell the
rate-payer how much of his property can be justly demanded by his
fellow creature? Who can tell the pauper when he asks for more
pay, that he receives just as much as he is entitled to? or can
explain to him why he has a right to what he already receives, but
no right to anything more? And yet, if this were really a right,
ought it not to be capable of such a definition?
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6.35 |
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It is said that property is a conventionalism—that its
accumulation by the few, is injurious to the interests of the
many—that its very existence is detrimental to those excluded
from its enjoyment—and that they have consequently a claim on
those possessing it. But is property a conventionalism? Let us
investigate this question.
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6.36 |
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Paley says, "Whatever is expedient is right." This is
a startling assertion; but it must be remembered, that the word
"expedient" is not used in its ordinary sense. It does
not here mean that which will best serve present purposes, but
that whose effects, both present and future, direct and
collateral, will be most beneficial. He does not defend that
expediency which would sacrifice the future welfare of a nation to
the interests of the present hour; but, he calls that expedient,
the total sum of whose good results, immediate and expectant, is
greater than that of its bad ones. When the expression is
interpreted in this extended sense, when the evils and benefits
that may arise in distant ages, meet with the same consideration
as the effects of today, the assertion no longer appears
extraordinary. Some moralists have, on the strength of this,
accused Paley of setting up a standard of right and wrong,
independent of that afforded by the Christian religion. They say
that he has first acknowledged that the precepts of the gospel
form our only safe guide, and then brings forward a principle in
opposition to them. They mistake his position. He brings forward a
principle not in opposition to, but in accordance with, those
precepts. He holds up to view the grand fundamental law, upon
which all the commands of our religion are based. He enunciates
the great proposition from which the doctrines of Christianity are
so many corollaries. God wills the happiness of man. That
happiness depends upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. He
gives him laws, by obeying which he satisfies those conditions. He
says, "Thou shalt not steal"; and why? Because, although
the thief may experience a temporary gratification in the
acquisition of stolen property, not only is this counterbalanced
by the corresponding annoyance on the part of the loser, but the
thief himself, as well as every other member of the community, is
in constant fear of similar losses. So that the sorrow of losing,
added to the general fear of robbery, far outweighs the individual
pleasure of acquirement. It follows, then, that obedience to the
command, "Thou shalt not steal," is eminently conducive
to the general happiness: that is, it is "expedient."
Again, man is told to love his neighbour as himself; and why?
Because by so doing, he not only increases the comfort of his
fellow-creatures, but he also himself reaps a rich reward, in the
pleasure that flows from the exercise of genuine benevolence. And
similarly in the analysis of every other case, we find that the
general happiness is the great end in view; that the commands of
the Almighty are such as will best secure that happiness, and
hence, that "expediency" is the primitive law of human
governance. If, having admitted the truth of this conclusion, we
have certain cases presented to us, on which we have no direct
expression of the divine will, our proper course is to appeal to
the principle which we discover to be in accordance with the
spirit of that will. Let us then apply the test to the question in
hand.
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6.37 |
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First—Is the institution of private property expedient? It
is. Man's happiness greatly depends upon the satisfaction of his
temporal wants. The fruits of the earth are a necessary means of
satisfying those wants. Those fruits can never be produced in
abundance without cultivation. That cultivation will never prevail
without the stimulus of certain possession. No man will sow when
others may reap. We have abundant proof of this, in the history of
every savage nation. Moreover, we see that so long as their bodily
cravings are unsatisfied, men will make no social progress.
Without ample provision of food and clothing, they have no time
for becoming civilised. And not becoming civilised, is the same
thing as making no moral or intellectual advances. And remaining
in mental darkness, involves entire insensibility to the highest
pleasures, of which the Creator has made human nature capable.
Hence, property greatly promotes the mental and bodily happiness
of mankind; that is, it is expedient. It must also be borne in
mind, that although the test of expediency has been appealed to,
in default of any direct command from the Almighty; the scriptures
contain abundance of indirect evidence of his will in this matter.
Not only in numerous instances does the bible inculcate duties, in
which the institution of private property is virtually recognised,
but it has one precept, which is clearly decisive. The single
command, "Thou shalt not steal," carries with it a
complete charter of the rights of possession. Lastly—if these
arguments were inconclusive, the simple fact, that there is
implanted in every man, a desire to possess, which desire, by the
accumulation of property, may be gratified without injury to
his fellow-creatures, this fact is in itself ample proof, that
individual possession is in accordance with the will of the
Creator. It follows, therefore, from the law of expediency
directly, from the constitution of man directly, and from the
revealed will of God by implication, that property is not a conventional,
but a natural, institution.
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6.38 |
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Now we must either admit the right of possession entirely, or
deny it altogether. We cannot say to a man, "So much of the
substance you have acquired by your labour is your own, and so
much belongs to your fellow-creatures." We cannot divide the
right. Either it is a right, or it is not. There is no medium. We
must say yes or no. If then, after a review of the arguments, we
allow that property is an institution natural to civilised man: if
we admit also, what necessarily follows from this—the right of
individual possession—and admit that too, as we must, to its
full extent; if we do this, the poor-law right vanishes entirely.
The two are totally inconsistent, and cannot co-exist.
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6.39 |
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To return to the test of expediency. The poor law has already
been measured by this principle, and found wanting. It was shown
that many and great are the evils, that have flowed, and must
flow, from its acknowledgment; that those evils have far more than
counterbalanced the benefits; and that all the good results, and
none of the bad ones, would follow from the substitution of
voluntary charity. If the reasoning was conclusive, the right is
rejected, without the necessity of an appeal to any of the
preceding arguments.
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6.40 |
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It is submitted, therefore:
1. That under circumstances like ours, in
which the poor man is prevented from earning his subsistence by
his labour, it is not our duty to give the subsistence without
the labour, but to break down those barriers to productive
industry, which selfish legislators have set up, and to place
the labourer in his proper position, by restoring society to its
natural state.
2. That by allowing the wicked to take advantage of the
right held out by the poor law, we not only annul the just
punishment awarded to them, but we also take away the most
effectual prompter to repentance and improvement.
3. That a real right usually admits of a clear definition,
but that the supposed poor-law does not.
4. That the institution of property, is sanctioned by the
law of expediency, by the implied will of God, and by the
constitution of man; and that if we acknowledge its rights, we
must deny those sought to be established by the poor law.
5. That the admission of a claim to a maintenance out of
the soil, is not only inconsistent with the rights of property,
but that it is in itself productive of more evil than good; that
is, it is inexpedient: and if it is inexpedient it cannot be a
right.
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6.41 |
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It will probably be objected to the proposed theory of
government, that if the administration of justice were the only
duty of the state, it would evidently be out of its power to
regulate our relations with other countries, to make treaties with
foreign powers, to enter into any kind of international
arrangement whatever, or to levy wars that might be absolutely
necessary.
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6.42 |
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So much of the objection as relates to the absence of power to
make treaties, may be disregarded. Commerce, or war, are nearly
always, directly or indirectly, the subjects of negotiation
between governments, and as free trade is presupposed by the
definition, it is clear that commercial treaties would never be
called for. The whole of the objection is therefore comprised in
its last clause—viz., the want of power to make war. Instead of
viewing such a result as an evil, we should rather hail it as one
of the greatest benefits that could arise from the recognition of
this principle. War has been the source of the greatest of
England's burdens. Our landowners would probably never have dared
to enact the corn laws, had not the people been intoxicated by the
seeming prosperity arising from war. The national debt, with all
its direful consequences, would not have been in existence, had
our rulers been deprived of the power of going to war. Our country
would never have been drained of the hard earnings of her
industrious sons, had not the uncurbed ambition of the aristocracy
involved us in war. Capital that would have constructed all our
railways many times over—that would have given every facility to
commerce—that would have set it upon a real instead of a nominal
foundation—property, the accumulated labour of generations, the
grand national store in time of need, is gone for ever. Not only
does England suffer from the yearly draught upon its resources
demanded by the national debt, it feels likewise the loss of the
property of which that debt is the representative. Not only has
the nation to pay the interest, it has lost the principal also.
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6.43 |
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Many entertain the opinion that war is essentially beneficial
to the community—that it invigorates the social organism; and
they refer to the commercial energy, exhibited during the late
continental campaigns, in proof of their assertion. But if, on the
one hand, they would bear in mind the accidental influences by
which such state was induced; whilst, on the other, they turned
their attention to the sufferings experienced by the lower orders,
during that period, rather than to the aggrandisement of the
trading classes, perhaps they would come to a different
conclusion. And, even admitting that war produces temporary good,
it infallibly inflicts a more than equivalent injury. It acts upon
a nation, as wine does upon a man. It creates the same unnatural
activity—the same appearance of increased strength. In a similar
manner does it call forth the supplies of life and energy provided
for the future; in like fashion is the excitement followed by a
corresponding depression; and so likewise is the strength of the
constitution gradually undermined; and the short-sighted
politician, who, judging by the apparent prosperity it produces,
pronounces war a benefit to a nation, is falling into the same
error, as the man who concludes that a spirituous stimulant is
permanently strengthening, because he experiences an accession of
vigour whilst under its influence.
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6.44 |
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War has been the nurse of the feudal spirit so long the curse
of all nations; and from that spirit has flowed much of the
selfish and tyrannical legislation under which we have so long
groaned. If, for the last four or five centuries, the civilised
world, instead of having been engaged in invasions and conquests,
had directed its attention to the real sources of
wealth—industry and commerce, science and the arts—long since
would our nobility have found that they were mere drones in the
hive, and long since would they have ceased to glory in their
shame.
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6.45 |
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When to the political and commercial evils of war, we add the
moral ones, when we remember that it is inconsistent with the
spirit of Christianity—that it unduly encourages animal
passions—that it exalts brute courage into the greatest of human
virtues—that it tends greatly to retard the civilisation of the
world—that it is the grand bar to the extension of that feeling
of universal brotherhood with all nations, so essential to the
real prosperity of mankind: when, in addition to these collateral
evils, we call to mind the immediate ones—the horrors of battle,
and the lamentations of kindred—we shall rather feel, that a
principle which of necessity excludes these things, should, on
that account alone, earnestly commend itself to our notice.
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6.46 |
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We are told that the time shall come, when nations "shall
beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning
hooks." That time may be yet afar off, but we are advancing
towards it—we shall eventually arrive at it, and that too, we
may assure ourselves, not by any sudden revolution, but by a
continued moral and intellectual progression. We must not wait for
a direct interposition of the Almighty to bring about this change;
we must use proper means; we must put our shoulders to the wheel,
and then look for the fulfilment of the promise as the result of
our obedience to the commands. But what are the means? One of them
we have before us. Confine the attention of our rulers to their
only duty, the administration of justice; and, as far as we are
concerned, the prophecy is fulfilled. Many will ask, "What
would be the use of our relinquishing war, unless other nations
will agree to do so likewise?" The same parties frequently
put a similar question, by way of an excuse for not assisting in
the reformation of social abuses—What can one man do? Need they
be told that men never come unanimously to the same conclusion, at
the same time, and that it is impossible they should do so? Need
they be told that all great changes have emanated from
individuals? Need they be told that what each leaves to the rest,
no one does? Would that every man would cease such puerile
pretences, and stand boldly forward to do his duty. National evils
would then soon be rectified. What is here true of men
individually, is true of men in masses. Never need we expect to
see all nations abandon war at the same time. One must lead the
way. Let England be that one. Let Britain first hold up the fair
flag of peace. Let our nation act up to the spirit of its
religion, without waiting for others to do the same. Not only
would precept and example induce neighbouring states to follow,
but new influences would come into play. Steps would quickly be
taken to establish the long-talked-of system of national
arbitration. Mankind would open their eyes to the advantages of a
peaceful decision of state disputes; appeal to arms would become
less and less frequent, and soon should we cease to applaud in
nations, that litigious and unchristian spirit, and those
barbarous notions of "honour," which we have learned to
despise in individuals.
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6.47 |
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"But," I am asked, "is there no such thing as a
necessary war?" In theory perhaps there may be; but it is
very rarely to be seen in practice. Is our war with China
necessary? Is our war with Afghanistan necessary? Was our war with
Syria necessary? Was our war with France necessary? Was our war
with America necessary? No. In defending ourselves against an
invasion, we might perhaps be said to be engaged in a necessary
war, but in no other case; and England has but little to fear on
that score. Improbable, however, as such an event may be, let us,
for the sake of argument, imagine that we involve ourselves in a
quarrel with some foreign state, which ends in their attacking us,
one of two things must happen. Either we repel the attack, or we
do not. Many there are, who, under such circumstances, would look
for an intervention of providence; others who would trust to the
principle of passive resistance. But, without sheltering under
either of these, let us suppose that active defence is necessary.
That defence may be conducted in two ways. Either the nation at
large must provide for it independently of the state, must call
together a council of war, volunteer supplies, and make all other
necessary arrangements; or the government must itself, as
heretofore, take the affair into its own hands. The first of these
alternatives may appear impracticable; but it is questionable
whether such impression does not arise from its disagreement with
our preconceived notions, rather than from any reasonable
conviction. The wars of savage nations have very frequently been
carried on without the guidance of any fixed executive power. We
have instances, too, in civilised countries, of rebellions in
which successful war has been maintained in opposition to the
government. How much more, then, might we expect an efficient
resistance in such a highly organised social condition as our own?
But admitting the impracticability of this principle—assuming
that the interference of the state would be necessary in such
cases, what follows? The insufficiency of the original definition,
and the consequent sacrifice of the doctrines propounded? No such
thing. Strange as it may seem, the admission of such a necessity
is no derogation to the theory before us. The question has
hitherto been considered in its application to England only,
because the cases brought forward have had exclusive reference to
internal policy; but, in the present instance, in which
international affairs are involved, we must no longer suppose such
a limited sphere of action. Some moral laws cannot receive their
perfect development unless universally acknowledged; they do not
agree with the present state of things, and they cannot be
measured by an arbitrary standard, with which they are professedly
inconsistent. To imagine one part of mankind acting upon a certain
principle—to perceive that they will be obliged to infringe that
principle, in their intercourse with the rest who are acting under
other guidance, and thence to infer that the principle is at
fault, is anything but logical. We must give the system fair play,
allow it a general application; and test it in accordance with its
own conditions. Suppose, then, that all nations confined the
attention of their governments, to the administration of justice,
aggressive war would cease; but when aggressive war ceases,
defensive war becomes unnecessary. We see, therefore, that the
concession that it might be requisite for the state to interfere
in cases of invasion, implies no error in the definition. The
exception would result, not from any inherent imperfection in the
principle, but from its confined application.
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6.48 |
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The positions are these:
1. That war is a great evil, and that the
fact of its exclusion by a proposed definition, is a powerful
argument in favour of that definition.
2. That depriving our rulers of the power to make war,
would be one of the most effectual means within our reach, of
hastening that period, when "nation shall not lift up sword
against nation."
3. That resistance to invasion is the only war that has
any claim to the title of necessary, and that we have little
need to fear its requisition.
4. That even assuming the occurrence of a descent upon our
shores, and allowing that the interference of the state would in
that case be necessary; the exception shows no defect in our
principle, but merely a want of extension in its practice.
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6.49 |
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Colonisation may possibly appear to some, to be a
stumbling-block in their way to the desirable conclusion, that the
administration of justice is the only duty of the state. We may
anticipate the question—What would the colonies do without our
governance and protection? I think facts will bear me out in
replying—Far better than they do with them.
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6.50 |
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The subject naturally ranges itself under three heads—the
interests of the mother country, of the emigrants, and of the
aborigines. First, then, the interests of the mother country.
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6.51 |
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The records of ancient nations have ever, shown that the riches
of a community, do not depend upon the acquirement of new
territory; our own history bears ample testimony of the same
character, and our present experience in every instance confirms
that testimony. The well known case of the United States may be
cited as an example. Whilst that country was a colony, it was a
burden to us; the expenses attending its government were far
greater than the profits derived from its trade; but since it has
become an independent kingdom, it has been a source of great gain.
Canada stands to us in the same position that the United States
once did; its distance from us is the same, its commercial
advantages are greater, it has the benefit of increased
civilisation, and yet, like its prototype, it does not repay the
cost of its management. Hindostan may be pointed out as another
illustration. The statement of the East India company's profit and
loss shows that, in this case also, the balance is against us; and
that our enormous oriental possessions have been an injury instead
of a benefit. Yet, in spite of these and many similar instances,
it is still tacitly assumed that extensive territorial property is
synonymous with wealth.
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6.52 |
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Men argue that, by monopolising the colonial trade, we obtain a
more extended market for our produce than we should otherwise
have, and that this must needs be a great benefit. The position is
a very plausible, but a no less fallacious, one. We monopolise
their trade from one of two causes. Either we make the articles
they consume at a lower rate than any other nation, or we oblige
them to buy those articles from us, though they might obtain them
for less elsewhere. If we can undersell other producers, it is
plain that we should still exclusively supply the market, were the
colonies independent. If we cannot undersell them, it may be made
equally clear that we are indirectly injuring ourselves to a
greater extent than we are benefited by the monopoly. For, if the
colonists take our manufactures, we must take their produce—they
cannot pay us in money. Now, the prices of the articles which they
barter for our manufactures (the demand remaining constant, as it
must) are regulated by the cost of their production; and the cost
of their production, other things being the same, depends
upon the prices of the commodities which they have to purchase. If
two parties agree to deal exclusively with each other, and one of
them doubles his charges, it is clear that the other cannot
continue to trade with him, unless he advances his terms in the
same ratio. So that by making the colonists pay an extra price for
certain merchandise with which we supply them, we do but cause an
equivalent increase in the cost of the produce which they send in
exchange, and thus entirely neutralise the supposed advantage. Nor
is this all. "Each country," says M'Culloch, "has
some natural or acquired capabilities that enable her to carry on
certain branches of industry more advantageously than any one
else. But the fact of a country being undersold in the markets of
her colonies, shows conclusively that, instead of having any
superiority, she labours under a disadvantage, as compared with
others, in the production of the peculiar articles in demand in
them. And hence, in providing a forced market in the colonies, for
articles that we should not otherwise be able to dispose of, we
really engage a portion of the capital and labour of the country
in a less advantageous channel than that into which it would
naturally have flowed." That system only is beneficial to the
world at large, and to each nation individually, under which every
commodity is obtained with the least expenditure of time and
labour. Were it otherwise, we might as well grow sugar and cotton
in English hot-houses, and then flatter ourselves that we were
deriving advantage from the encouragement of home-grown instead of
foreign produce!
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6.53 |
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We come, then, to the conclusion that, in this case, as in
every other, the country loses by this exclusive dealing. But who
are the gainers? The monopolists. And who are the monopolists? The
aristocracy. Into their pockets, in the shape of salaries to civil
and military officers, dividends of profits, etc., has gone a
large part of the enormous revenue of the East India company.*83
Into their pockets goes the great bulk of the extra four millions
a year which we pay for Jamaica sugar. Into their pockets has gone
the large additional sum annually paid by the nation for coffee
and other colonial articles, more than would have been paid but
for the protection afforded to West India productions. The
colonies, then, do but resolve themselves into another channel,
through which the earnings of industry flow into the coffers of
idleness. The rich owners of colonial property must have
protection, as well as their brethren, the landowners of
England—the one their prohibitive duties, the other their corn
laws; and the resources of the poor, starved, overburdened people
must be still further drained, to augment the overflowing wealth
of their rulers.
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6.54 |
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Secondly, the welfare of the emigrants. In considering this
part of the subject, the question may arise—Has not every
colonist a claim to protection from the mother country? Custom
answers, "Yes." Reason says, "No." Viewed
philosophically, a community is a body of men associated together
for mutual defence. The members of that community are supposed to
occupy a certain territory; and it may be fairly assumed that the
privileges conferred are only enjoyed by those residing within
that territory. The nation cannot be expected to extend protection
to its members wherever they may chance to wander. It cannot be
called upon to defend the rights of a citizen in whatever corner
of the earth he may choose to locate himself. The natural
inference is, that when a man leaves such a community he loses his
membership, he forfeits his privileges, and he foregoes all claim
to civil assistance. It is presumed that he duly considers, on the
one hand, the benefits to be derived by his contemplated
emigration, and, on the other, the evils attendant on the loss of
citizenship; and that the prospective advantages of a change have
the preponderence.
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6.55 |
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But, waiving the question of right, suppose we examine to what
extent the admission of this claim, has, in time past, been of use
to the emigrant. Let us inquire how far the history of our
colonies, bears evidence of the proffered protection. In the
declaration of American independence, we have a candid expression
of the experience of the settlers on this point; and the document
may be referred to, as exhibiting a fair abstract of the effects
of home-country governance. Speaking of the king—the
personification of the mother country, they say,—
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6.56 |
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"He has obstructed the administration of justice by
refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.
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6.57 |
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He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither
swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their
substance.
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6.58 |
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He has kept among us in times of peace standing armies, without
the consent of our legislatures.
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6.59 |
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He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction
foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws;
giving his assent to their pretended acts of legislation.
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6.60 |
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For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us.
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6.61 |
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For protecting them by a mock trial from punishment for any
murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these
states.
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6.62 |
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For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world.
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6.63 |
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For imposing taxes upon us without our consent.
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6.64 |
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For depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by
jury," etc.
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6.65 |
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Truly we have here, some admirable specimens of the blessings
of mother-country protection! Nor are we without analogous
instances in our times. The late outbreak in Canada, is a plain
indication, of the existence of a similar state of things, to that
once experienced by the Americans. And, it is extremely probable,
that were we to put it to the Canadians, whether we should
continue to take care of them, they would reply, that if it were
the same thing to us, they would much rather take care of
themselves! We may turn for another example to the settlements in
Australia. A living illustration here presents itself, of the
evils resulting from the officious interference of our
legislature. Thousands of poor emigrants who have been sent out by
government, are now without employment, subsisting upon the
contributions of the charitable, and almost in a state of
starvation. The distress has arisen from the exportation of large
bodies of labourers, whilst there has been no corresponding
increase in the number of capitalists. Had this colony been left
to itself, labour and capital would have kept pace with each
other, as they always have done, and always will do; but a
meddling state, must needs attempt to regulate the natural laws of
society, and hence the calamitous result. Many similar instances,*84
of the injury inflicted upon emigrants, under the pretence of
protection, might be quoted, were not those already mentioned
sufficiently conclusive.
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6.66 |
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Thirdly—the interests of the aborigines. A first glance at
the bearings of the question, is sufficient to show, that the
natives of colonised countries, will meet with much better
treatment, at the hands of those settlers, whose emigration has
been gradual and unprotected, than from those who are aided by a
powerful government, and backed by a military force. In the one
case, being the weaker party, the colonists are obliged to stand
on their good behaviour, and are induced, through fear, to deal
justly with the owners of the soil; in the other, acting upon the
barbarous maxim that they have a lawful right to whatever
territories they can conquer, forcible possession of the new
country, is taken—a continued scene of oppression and bloodshed
ensues, and the extermination of the injured race, is, in many
cases, the consequence. This is no imaginary picture. Our colonial
history, to our shame be it spoken, is full of the injustice and
cruelty, to which the original possessors of the soil have been
subjected. The extinct tribes of the North American Indians, bear
witness of the fact; the gradual retreat of the natives of
Australia, may be quoted in support of it; and the miserable
condition of the inhabitants of the East Indies, speaks volumes,
on the inhumanity attendant upon state colonisation. The ryots, or
cultivators of the soil, in Hindostan, are taxed to the extent of
nearly one-half of what they produce,*85
and that, by a foreign government, in which they have no
voice—which is oppressing them in all directions, and apparently
views them as beings created only for the purpose of producing
revenue. Another portion of the population is induced to aid our
troops, in the support of this despotic government, and whole
regiments of them have been put to death, for daring to disobey
the tyrannical commands of their oppressors. The recent affair in
Afghanistan, affords a further example. Not satisfied with the
immense empire already within their grasp, our Eastern government,
like the wolf in the fable, must needs find a pretext for
quarreling with a neighbouring nation, with the ultimate intention*86
of obtaining possession of their country. And in that war too,
some of its officers have been guilty of treachery, of which many
a savage would have been ashamed. Thus it is that we exemplify the
sublime principles of Christianity.
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6.67 |
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Having assigned reasons for condemning the artificial system of
colonisation, it only remains to inquire, how far the natural
system, may be considered feasible. There will be no occasion to
enter into any arguments. We may at once appeal to experience, and
that experience is conclusive. Pennsylvania affords an admirable
example, of a colony originated, and carried out, solely by
private enterprise; a colony in which the claims of all parties
were duly respected—where natives met with honourable treatment,
where strangers as well as friends could obtain justice; a colony
that long stood pre-eminent for its prosperity, and which may even
now be said to feel the benefits of the liberal conduct of its
founders.
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6.68 |
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The preceding arguments go to prove:
1. That the riches of a country are not
increased by great colonial possessions.
2. That the producing classes, both of the colony and the
home country, are necessarily injured by any commercial
monopoly.
3. That the aristocracy are the only gainers.
4. That emigrants have no claim to protection from the
mother country.
5. That where this so-called protection has been given, it
has always been converted into an engine for their oppression.
6. That if emigration was carried on by private
enterprise, the aborigines, would obviously be less liable to
the unjust treatment, which has ever characterised the conduct
of civilised settlers towards them.
7. That the case of Pennsylvania, gives ample assurance,
of the superiority of the natural system of colonisation.
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6.69 |
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And hence, that in this case, as well as in those previously
discussed, the rejection of legislative interference is eminently
desirable.
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6.70 |
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The question of state interference has been hitherto examined,
only in those departments of its application, in which its
existing effects are visible—viz., in commerce, religion,
charity, war, and colonisation. In all of them that interference
has been deprecated. It now remains to consider those social
institutions which, though at present prospering in their original
unfettered simplicity, are threatened by schemes for legislative
supervision. Of these the first in importance stands—education.
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6.71 |
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It is clear that a system of national instruction is excluded
by our definition. It cannot be comprehended under the
administration of justice. A man can no more call upon the
community to educate his children, than he can demand that it
shall feed and clothe them. And he may just as fairly claim a
continual supply of material food, for the satisfaction of their
bodily wants, as of intellectual food, for the satisfaction of
their mental ones. It will be the aim of the succeeding arguments
to show the advantages of this exclusion.
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6.72 |
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Mankind are apt to decide upon the means to be employed in the
attainment of an end, without sufficient examination into their
fitness. Some great object in contemplation, the most obvious mode
of securing it is chosen, without duly considering the extreme
importance of discovering whether it is the best mode—without
ever inquiring whether its ultimate effects may be as good as its
immediate ones—without asking what corruptions the machinery of
their institution may be liable to—never putting to themselves
the question: Is there any other way of arriving at the
desideratum?—and neglecting a host of other considerations of
like character. Such is the treatment of the question before us.
The education of the people is the end in view; an end fraught
with results the most momentous—results more intimately
connected with the prosperity and happiness of posterity, than,
perhaps, any others that may flow from our conduct—results which
may accelerate or retard the advancement of mankind for hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of years. Yet are there objections, to the
method by which this end is to be compassed, of the utmost
consequence, that have been entirely overlooked by its
advocates—objections fundamentally affecting the principles upon
which it rests; and which, if they be admitted as valid, must
completely overthrow the whole scheme.
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6.73 |
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In the first place, national education assumes that a uniform
system of instruction is desirable. A general similitude in the
kinds of knowledge taught, and the mode of teaching it, must be
necessary features in a state-training establishment. The question
therefore presents itself—Would a universal fixed plan of
intellectual culture be beneficial? After due consideration, I
think the general answer will be—No. Almost all men of
enlightened views agree that man is essentially a progressive
being—that he was intended to be so by the Creator—and that
there are implanted in him, desires for improvement, and
aspirations after perfection, ultimately tending to produce a
higher moral and intellectual condition of the world. The grand
facts of history, both sacred and profane—the great principles
and promises of revealed religion—the deductions of abstract
reasoning—all go to prove that, notwithstanding the oft-repeated
falling back, in spite of every difficulty that may be thrown in
the way, and in defiance of all apparently adverse circumstances,
still, that the grand and irresistible law of human existence, is
progressive improvement. The very obstacles themselves ultimately
serve as stepping stones to a higher condition—the tyranny of an
aristocracy is working out the liberties of the people—the
corruption of an established church has helped to raise the
standard of religious purity—the blindfolding doctrines of
priestcraft produce the more perfect discovery, and the still
deeper appreciation of the great principles of Christianity—and,
as of old, so in our day, the opposition to truth, still tends to
accelerate its final triumph. If, then, the belief set forth at
the commencement of this essay—that as there are laws for the
guidance of the inorganic world—laws for the government of the
animate creation—laws for the development of individual
mind—so there are laws for the social governance of man—if, I
say, this belief be received, it may be fairly assumed, that, in
accordance with the great design of human progression, the
Almighty has given laws to the general mind, which are ever
working together for its advancement. It may be fairly assumed
that, in this case as in the more tangible ones, the apparently
untoward circumstances are, in reality, eminently conducive to the
attainment of the object sought after. That all the prejudices,
the mental idiosyncrasies, the love of opposition, the tendencies
to peculiar views, and a host of other qualities, in their
infinitely varied proportions and combinations, are all conspiring
to bring about the intellectual, moral, and social perfection of
the human race. If it be granted that man was created a
progressive being, it must be granted, also, that the
constitution, given to him by his Creator, was the one most
perfectly adapted to secure his progression. It may be presumed
that, if a uniform construction of mind had been best calculated
to attain this end, it would have been adopted; but, as the
opposite law has been given—so that, instead of finding minds
similar, we find no two alike—unlimited variety, instead of
uniformity, being the existing order of things—we must infer
that this is the arrangement tending, in the greatest degree, to
produce perfection. This conclusion may be supported, not only by
abstract reasoning, but by experience. Varied mental constitution
produces variety of opinion; different minds take different views
of the same subject; hence, every question gets examined in all
its bearings; and, out of the general mass of argument, urged
forward by antagonist parties, may sound principle be elicited.
Truth has ever originated from the conflict of mind with mind; it
is the bright spark that emanates from the collision of opposing
ideas; like a spiritual Venus, the impersonation of moral beauty,
it is born from the foam of the clashing waves of public opinion.
Discussion and agitation are the necessary agents of its
discovery; and, without a universal dissimilitude in the minds of
society, discussion and agitation could never exist.
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6.74 |
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If, then, it be admitted, that infinite variety in the mental
conformation of individuals is essential to the advancement of the
general human mind, what shall we say to a system which would
train the feelings and intellects of a whole nation after one
pattern—which hopes to correct all the irregularities implanted
by the Creator, and proposes to take the plastic characters of our
youth, and press them, as nearly as possible, into one common
mould? And yet this must be the manifest tendency of any uniform
routine of education. Natures differently constituted must be
gradually brought, by its action, into a condition of similarity.
The same influences, working upon successive generations, would
presently produce an approximation to a national model. All men
would begin to think in the same direction—to form similar
opinions upon every subject. One universal bias would affect the
mind of society; and, instead of a continual approach to the
truth, there would be a gradual divergence from it. Under our
present condition, the eccentricities and prejudices induced by
one course of education, are neutralised by the opposing
tendencies implanted by others; and the growth of the great and
truthful features only of the national mind ensues. If, on the
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